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by 
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"A main source of our failure 
to understand is that we do 
not command a clear view of 
the use of our words. " 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philo-
sophical Investigations.--
A. Introduction 
"Instead of posing as prophets we 
must become the makers of our fate. 
We must learn to do things as well 
as we can and to look out for our 
mistakes. " Karl Popper in The Open 
Society and Its Enemies 
In this essay, I will report on some recent explorations into the border 
territories of geography, philosophy, and planning. Interim reports 
with extensive references to relevant literature have already appeared, (I) 
but more detailed discussions have been saved for a forthcoming mono-
graph. (2) The following exposition will borrow freely and without de-
tailed quotations from these writings. 
* An earlier version of this essay was presented at the meetings of 
the International Geographical Union held in Budapest, August 9-14,1971, 
and of the IVth International Congress on Logic, Methodology, and Phil-
osophy of Science held in Bucharest, August 29 - September 4, 1971. 
Even more preliminary versions were discussed at seminars held at the 
Australian National University, York University, University of Michigan, 
Pennsylvania State University and the University of GHteborg. 
During the early conceptualization of the paper. I received financial 
support from the Center for Population Planning at the University of 
Michigan. Conversations with Stephen Gale, Robert Douglas, and 
Paul Lighfoot have been particularly useful. 
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The raison d'etre of this particular research lies in my view 
that the goal of social science theory and model formulation should 
be to provide tools for societal action and control. (3) More speci-
fically, my endeavors have been prompted by the belief that scien-
tific models ideally could perform such steering functions first by 
indicating which alternative actions can be accommodated within 
the bounds of currently accepted scientific knowledge, and second, 
by specifying the foreseeable side effects of these actions. It 
follows that evaluation of social science models should be in terms 
of their ability to furnish guidelines for visionary but nevertheless 
responsible change. In this regard, my conception of social eng-
ineering has closer affinity with the notion of piecemeal social 
engineering favored by Popper than with his notion of utopian 
:social engineering. ( 4) I nevertheless prefer the term social 
engineering to the term social planning, primarily because the 
former provokes greater awareness of the possibility of creating 
unacceptable side effects. 
In the remainder of this essay I will draw attention to three 
interrelated issues involved in my programmatic statement. 
These issues concern: (l), the relations between observational 
and theoretical statements; (2), the relations between the concepts 
of explanation and prediction; (3), the relations between statements 
from different levels in the hierarchy of reasoning. In the first 
section, these issues will be discussed in relation to epistemolo-
gical problems. In the second section, I will proceed into the 
realm of spatial analysis and ask whether a well-known family of 
spatial models actually possesses the ideal characteristics out-
lined in the first section. Finally, in the third section, the pre-
ceeding philosophical and geographical evaluations will be merged 
and used as a basis for remarks on the appropriateness of employing 
existing spatial theories and models as tools in social engineering. 
B. Epistemological Principles 
B. I. Observational and theoretical statements 
Standard positivi_stic accounts assume that there is a basic d\{ference 
between the language of a theory and the language of the empJirical 
observations which the theory is designed to explain. It has in fact 
sometimes been argued that the prime concern of the scientific enter-
prise is to br~dge the gap between these two languages. In the text-
book case, this connection is normally established by providing the 
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theory with a model, which in turn is connected with observables; 
through this translation procedure, the formal syntax of the theory 
will have been given semantical meaning. 
The quoted procedure provides a dangerously oversimplified 
approach. Problems arise for many reasons, but primarily because 
the results will be highly dependent both on our particular definition 
of what a theory is and on our views of the relationships between a 
theory and its various models. This means that when statements 
written in the theoretical and observational languages are deemed 
not to conform with one another, there is no a priori reason for a:i-
bering to the empiricists' contention that it is always the theory 
which is wrong. Instead, our increased awareness of the problems 
of subjectivity in the social sciences suggests that it may not be only 
our theoretical statements which need to be revised but our obser-
vational statements as well. 
The tenor of this proposal is of course shared by many, (5) even 
though it goes counter to much in our methodological heritage. As 
a consequence, it does not fit too well into any of the standard def-
initions of what a theory is. (6) This is certainly the case with Ru-
ssell's atomistic views, according to which theories are disguised 
observation statements such that every theoretical term is defined 
as observables; the implications of Craig's theorem provide suf-
ficient evidence for suggesting that if such formal similarity were 
the only required relationship between theory, model, and observa-
tion, then it would be impossible to distinguish the three concepts 
from one another. (7) For this reason, it seems desirable to recog-
nize explicitly both that theories and models have very different 
epistemological characteristics and that a theory can be provided 
with more than one model. (8) It follows that comparative work with 
alternative models is likely to suggest theoretical improvements. 
In addition, such work should help to isolate situations where a 
priori theories could influence the actual physical construction of 
new realities. In the latter case, social engineering would furnish 
a mechanism whereby the "is" of the empirical could be brought in 
closer agreement with the "ought" of visionary politics and prescrip-
tive theory. The implementation of this approach, however, requires 
rejection of the view that theories are disguised observation statements. 
The need for assessing social engineering theories as much in 
terms of their normative content as in terms of current empirical 
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truth conflicts also with the so called realist view of Quine and Braith-
waite;(9) since normative theories by definition speak about alternative 
possible worlds of the future, they consist not only of true or false 
statements about real alternatives. 
The social engineer's use of subject matter theories necessitates 
revision of Nagel's instrumentalist view as well. (10) Thus, it is usually 
not sufficient for the responsible and action-oriented social scientist 
to think of theories only asintellectual instruments whereby empirical 
observations of past events can be represented and interpreted. More 
specifically, if we limited our conception of a theory to that of an 
"inference ticket in accordance with which conclusions about observ-
able facts may be drawn from factual premises, not as premises from 
which such conclusions are obtained"(lO) then we may be tempted not 
to give sufficient attention to the formulation of much needed perscrip-
tive theories, i.e. to the formulation of constructs whose double pur-
pose is to mirror current empirical observations and to aid our ev-
aluation of the many possible future worlds. In addition, the instru-
mentalist view comes close to the conception of a theory as a black 
box into which selected input data are entered and out of which, 
somehow, a set of insights emerge. 
It is willingly admitted that the inference strategy of the instrumentalists 
eventually can lead to valuable ampliative generalizations. Likewise, 
it should be admitted that this black box approach can be very powerful 
for short term predictions. For the responsible planner concerned with 
long term investments, however, it is not a particularly desirable ap-
proach. The reason is, of course, that such black box predictions 
tend to be based more on observed covariance relations established 
via correlation analysis than on causa.l relations established via re-
gression analysis. It follows that if predictions derived from the for-
mer type of models were to be implemented through social engineering 
action, ~hen the risk of creating long range unforeseen side effects 
would increase. 
In conclusion, none of the conventional definitions of a theory seems 
to meet the needs of those social engineers who wish to rely on theories 
and models for guidelines and tools in the achievement of action and 
change. The limitations inherent in the discussed views of the theory 
concept are likely to become increasingly acute, especially if social 
scientists become more concerned with fitting reality to a priori pre-
ference premises and less engaged in formulating theories which 
mirror empirical occurences as these are currently observed. In 
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this context, it is interesting to note that already Neurath, in one of 
the classical manifestos from the Vienna school, suggested something 
rather similar. Thus, he seems to have proposed that when state-
ments from the empirical and theoretical languages are found not to 
agree with one another, then it may sometimes be more appropriate 
to rebuild reality, or at least our statements about reality, than to 
obtain morphism between the two languages by replacing the theo-
retical statements. (ll) It may be important to realize that Neurath 
was the only member of the original Vienna group who had a strong 
interest in politics and the social sciences. 
It should be evident by now that scientifically-anchored social 
engineering requires far reaching changes in conventional ways of 
thinking and therefore in the definition of some of our most funda-
mental epistemological concepts. Thus, it is not sufficient for the 
social scientist curr. social engineer to be concerned only withal-
tering his theories so they conform with empirical observations, 
but he must also be concerned with rebuilding reality so it conforms 
with the normative, ideological, and moral premises of his theories. 
Such an approach seems necessary particularly for the utopian 
social engineer, who frequently must decide on the appeal of a given 
theory not so much on the basis of whether the model prediction P 
agrees with past observations, as on whether the future realization 
of Pis deemed so desirable that the other parts of the system should 
be altered in such a way that they come to agree with those axioms 
and intermediate theorems without which the model could not have 
produced P. Identical approaches should satisfy the needs of the more 
cautious piecemeal social engineer whose main interest is in whether 
a particular plan agrees sufficiently well with empirical observations 
to produce the intended results. 
In conclusion, it can not be overstressed that our degree of be-
lief in a given theory with social engineering implications depends 
not only on its logical coherence and associated empirical obser-
vations, but also on our estimates of pragmatic utilities. (12) Re-
phrased, this means that the appeal of a particular theoryi:iepends 
not only on its current truth status but also on our anticipations of 
the positive and negative effects that would be created if its predic-
tions actually were to be implemented Anticipating the need for 
this kind of intellectual construct, we may be wise in following 
Achinstein' s suggestion and put more emphasis on the development 
of imaginary as opposed to representational or observational 
models. (13) 
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B. 2. Explanation and prediction 
It is well known how Hempel and Oppenheim in their classical treatise 
argued that there is a structural identity of symmetry relationship 
between the notions of explanation and prediction. The only distinc-
tion between the two concepts was said to be pragmatic. (14) Thus, 
it was held that in explanation the phenomenon under investigation, 
E, is known to have happened, which leaves the initial conditions, 
{Ckl, and the general laws, {Li] , to be determined. In prediction, 
on tne other hand, the initial conditions and general laws are known 
and the final event is left to be determined. 
The most common position today is, of course, that the original 
symmetry thesis is only partly true in the sense that every adequate 
explanation is said to provide a potential prediction, while success-
ful prediction is not the same as successful explanation. On the op-
erational level this important distinction suggests several positive 
analogs with the distinction between least-squares regression and 
correlation. More specifically, such changes in the general law state-
ments that lead to reversal of the hypothesized functional relationship --
i.e. to a reversal of the x- and y- axes -- will affect the magnitude of 
the regression coefficients but not the value of the correlation coeff-
icients. (15) 
Since the side effects of social engineering seem easier to antic-
ipate if the planning operations are executed through manipulation of 
cause rather than effect variables, action prompted by interpretations 
of observed correlations may well create more problems than it solves; 
even though models which yield high correlations can provide powerful 
short term predictions, they are by definition not explanatory models. 
It follows that correlation analyses can not help us anticipate the long 
term effects of a given action. Conversely, explanatory analyses can 
not only delineate the bounds of the physically possible, but also· indi-
cate some of the side effects of an action. In practice, however, this 
ideal property of explanatory analysis can rarely be realized, simply 
because we do not yet possess any good procedures for substituting 
the initial set of laws, {Lil , as components into another set of laws, 
[Lj), with less restrictive boundary conditions. The role of explan-
atory models in social engineering is further complicated by the un-
resolved problems connected with Arrow's impossibility theorem. (16) 
As a consequence, available tools require that the target population 
and aspiration levels be explicitly defined. 
In conclusion, it is unfortunate that social scientists have not yet 
6 
ANTIPODE,4,1 (FEBRUARY, 1972} 
developed a host of good analytic models which can be used as aids in 
the determination of the direction and strength of causal relationships 
and thereby in the selection of proper target variables. The fact re-
mains, however, that prediction and explanation are asymmetrical 
concepts much in the same manner as correlation and regression. 
It follows that if we wish to keep the side effects under control, then 
our proposals for action are likely to be more responsible if they 
are anchored in explanatory as opposed to predictive analyses. Models 
which yield high correlation but fluctuating regression coefficients are 
not sufficient for this task. Rather we need detailed knowledge of law-
like statements as specified in terms of non-erratic causal parameters. 
B. 3. The hierarchy of statements 
The discussion thus far suggests that responsible social engineering 
requires a free but nevertheless disciplined interplay between the 
various levels in the hierarchy of reasoning. Thus, it is through 
such an interplay that we may hope to combine the openmindedness 
that characterized my comments about observational and theoretical 
languages, with the stringency and fear for creating long term negative 
side effects that caused me to prefer explanatory regression type models 
to predictive correlation analyses. By anchoring our research in such 
an analytic framework, it may in fact be possible to produce models 
which are useful both for the visionary utopian and for the cautious 
piecemeal social engineer. 
On the highest level of abstraction, such a framework requires 
that close connections be established between moral preferences, con-
ceptualization, and alternative logical calculi. It is challenging, for 
instance, to speculate on the usefulness of subject matter theories 
written in the language of deontic logic, i.e. in a language which 
through its explicit focus on action and norm systems bears directly 
on the problems of social engineering. (17) The reason for this sugg-
estion is that the ambiguities of subsequent social engineering appli-
cations may be minhr.ized by having the initial conceptualization of 
the subject matter problem occur within the bounds of a logical system 
which initially has been chosen so as to avoid later conflicts between 
the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of the resulting theories. (18) 
The important point in this argument is that the descriptive theory, 
whose purpose is to mirror past empirical events, must be written 
in the same logical calculus as the prescriptive theories, whose 
purpose is to help the social engineer choose among the many pos-
sible worlds of the future. While the main issues tackled by descriptive 
theories would remain those of explanation and empirical validity, the 
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issues addressed by prescriptive theories would concern both what is 
scientificallv possible and not possible, and what is ethically permitted 
and not permitted. Since the social engineer's evaluation of what is 
possible and not possible at least partly depends on what the descrip-
tive theories distinguish as being empirically valid, he should require 
that the two types of theory be phrased in identical logical calculi. 
Despite the well known difficulties of interpretation, (19) various 
modal logics may provide the formal syntax by which descriptive 
theories can be corrected. Thus, it seems intuitively clear that sev-
eral theorems from non-standard logics can throw light on both moral 
and operational problems in social engineering. To substantiate this 
intuitive assertion we need only recall the discussion of von Wright's 
deontic expression(20): 
O{p\q) & OE-op\q) (I) 
Given the usual notation that 0 stands for obligation, expression 
(I) of course says that, given that it is the case that q, then it ought 
to be the case that p but also not be the case that p. Since one can 
argue that it is possible to have logically acceptable normative sys-
tems which imply inconsistent conditional obligations, we automa-
tically create the situation of predicament specified by (I). Rephr-
ased,. this means that expression (I) states that whatever the change 
agent does, he does something he ought to omit, and whatever he 
omits, he neglects something that he ought to do. It is important 
to note, however, that this type of predicament can arise only if he 
already has done something which is deontically impossible. Thus, 
it can be demonstrated that if the act of an agent gives rise to conflic-
ting duties of the type specified in (1), then this act is itself something 
from which he has a duty to abstain; as an example, promising the 
forbidden is itself forbidden. 
For the soci~l engineer it seems particularly interesting to note 
that situations analogous to the situation of predicament tend to occur 
when two or more deontic life-trees are amalgamated, i.e. when the 
change agent is forced to act under the influence of more than one norm 
system. The cases of the western planner working in non-western 
cultures and the middle class politician dealing with the ghetto immed-
iately come to mind. 
Exactly how a particular non-standard logic can influence the 
formulation of subsequent theories and models is less evident. However, 
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recent attempts to write decision models in the languages of fuzzy 
sets and many-valued logics offer interesting indications of what 
eventually may be achieved. (21) In those particular instances it is 
thus clear how the choice of model language has influenced the low-
level reasoning that occurs when descriptive theories and empirical 
observations are confronted with each other. But social engineer-
ing action furthermore requires that the model predictions derived 
from descriptive theories be compared with the pragmatic utilities 
and moral consequences which would arise if these predictions ac-
tually were allowed to be implemented in the real world. As a 
consequence, it seems useful to distinguish representational theo-
ries and models from prescriptive or imaginary theories and models. 
This distinction is especially prompted by the fact that predictions 
derived from conventional models can be confronted with observations 
of what has already occurred, while predictions derived from imag-
inary models are strictly speaking non-testable in the sense that 
they relate to events that have not yet occurred. 
In summary, I have attempted to isolate the relationships between 
the various levels of reasoning which I deem particularly important 
for those who share my view that the goal of the social sciences is 
to provide tools for responsible societal action. The fact remains, 
however, that one of the most crucial steps in any scientific discourse 
concerns the translation between statements from the various levels 
in the hierarchy of reasoning. To keep the noise down, we must there-
fore be extremely careful in our specification of correspondence rules. 
It seems in fact that the notion of correspondence rules itself must be 
defined more broadly than usual, perhaps along the lines discussed by 
Schaffner. (22} Thus, given my previous remarks, it is not sufficient 
to equate correspondence rules with operational definitions; such a 
conception would be too closely akin to the unacceptable dichotomous 
view of theoretical and observational languages. 
The need for redefining the concept of correspondence rules is 
especially pressing for constructs with social engineering applica-
bility. This is so because the social engineer frequently conveys 
meaning on theoretical terms not only by relating them to obser-
vables and to imagined future realizations but also by relating them 
to antecedent theories which typically contain references to both 
observables and unobservables. The definition of correspondence 
rules should consequently be wide enough to allow reference both 
to imagined possible and permitted future realizations, and to 
previously existing descriptive theories. With this definition, 
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correspondence rules could be used as linkages in collapsed causal 
sequences through which theoretical terms with antecedent meaning 
can be allowed to account for currently observed realities as well 
as for imagined future realizations. Within such a framework, cor-
respondence rules and reduction functions would take on pivotal roles 
in the perpetual game of scientific progress; each theoretical term 
would have a primary sense specified by the initial theory, and a 
secondary sense ascribed to it through the couplings provided by 
reduction functions and correspondence rules. In the context of the 
present essay, this is an important argument, since it leads to 
some extremely pertinent questions about reductionism and about 
the subsequent use of social science models as a basis for social 
engineering. I will return to this issue below, but it has to do with 
those extensions of Arrow's impossibility theorem that concern the 
problem of how to connect models from different aspiration and 
aggregation levels. 
C. Spatial Models 
C. 1. Observational and theoretical statements 
This is not the occasion for a detailed and well referenced discussion 
of the relations between observational and theoretical statements in 
geography. Suffice it to say that even a cursory examination of the his-
tory of the discipline provides overwhelming evidence for the conclu-
sion that the majority of statements are either statements of empirical 
regularities or statements of empirical regularities which then have 
been given theoretical interpretations. Using the same terminology 
as earlier, one has started off with a set of observational statements 
which then at best have been rephrased in a theoretical language. The 
intent has thus been to mirror empirical observations as closely as 
possible. When statements from the two languages have been found 
not to coincide, the majority of spatial analysts have consequently pro-
ceeded as if the observations were correct and the theories were wrong; 
in the terminology of the present essay, they have attempted to form-
ulate descriptive theories, usually of Nagel's instrumentalist type. 
This characterization certainly holds for H~gerstrand's important 
development of spatial diffusion theory. (23) Primarily because of its 
clarity, this work provides an excellent example of an investigation 
which began with a set of detailed descriptions of the spatial proper-
ties of innovation diffusion and then proceeded to the formulation and 
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subsequent reformulations of a set of simulation models. More spe-
cifically, the main characteristic of Hf!gerstrand's approach was that 
the observed spatial patterns were conceived as being the result of 
an interplay between deterministic and random factors. On the model 
level this conception then took the form that the general development 
was determined by various distance functions which in turn were 
translated via the frequentist probability interpretation into the oper-
ational form of mean information fields, while the exact development 
was conceived as being influenced by a large number of chance factors, 
operationally represented by the drawing of random numbers. Finally, 
the results from these simulations were visually compared with the 
empirically observed patterns after which the exact rules of the game 
were successively changed until the generated patterns agreed suffi-
ciently well with the observed ones. It follows that the primary pur-
pose of Ha:gerstrand's simulation models was to describe empirically 
observed spatial patterns, i.e. to arrive at descriptive rather than 
prescriptive theory. 
The development of Christaller's central place theory, (24) of the 
various distance models of the gravity type, (25) and of the intracity 
population density models(26) can be described in much the same 
manner as the development of Hflgerstrand"s diffusion theory. As 
an example, it is fascinating reading to trail the mathematical form-
ulations of how population densities taper off with increasing distance 
from the city center; Clark initially started off with a set of straight-
forward regression analyses, which then were used as the observational 
backdrop both for Alonso's extensions via economic equilibrium inter-
pretations and for Newling's curve fittings. The former have then been 
extended into Casetti's and Papageorgiou's alternate explanations on 
the one hand and into Scott's maximum likelihood derivations on the 
other. 
In conclusion -- and without having gone into any detail -- I would 
assert that with the exception of Ll:Jsch's normative location theory, (27) 
practically all so-called theories and models in geography are positiv-
istic constructs in which the instrumentalist attitude has prevailed and 
in which theoretical statements successively have been reformulated 
to agree better and better with empirical observations. 
C. 2. Explanation and prediction 
I have already noted that although adequate explanation may lead to 
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successful prediction, successful prediction is not the same as suc-
cessful explanation. Likewise it has been stressed that even though 
correlation coefficients may well indicate the strength of the statis-
tical covariance between a set of variables, it is mathematical par-
ameters like regression coefficients that provide summary state-
ments of the general laws which constitute a required part of the 
explanans. It follows that detailed analysis of the stability of em-
pirically estimated causal parameters can indicate the explanatory 
power of a given model. In more operational terms, it is by care-
fully analyzing the behavior of its mathematical parameters that 
we conclude whether a causal model contains large specification 
errors. Thus, if the estimated parameters are found to vary er-
ratically over time, space, and aggregation levels, then we should 
take this as an indication that the model has not been properly 
specified or calibrated. 
For this reason, it is regrettable that most spatial research 
has not focused on the accumulation of knowledge in terms of sys-
tematic collection of JBrameter estimates. There are ~verthe-
less a small number of models for which comparable estimates 
do exist. The most relevant of these data relate to the distance 
exponent of the gravity regression model. (28) Less'comparable 
results have been obtained with the Clark and Newling type models 
of intracity population densities. (26) In addition, some cell count-
ing models, especially the negative binomial and the Thomas' Double 
Poisson models, have been applied frequently enough to yield useful 
data on the behavior of empirical parameter estimates. (29) 
In neither of the mentioned cases have I found the parameters 
to be stationary. Instead, it seems that whatever short term pre-
dictive power the models may have is due either to circular reas-
oning or to high spatial and temporal autocorrelation effects; de-
tailed scrutiny of the erratically behaving JBrameters indicate that 
several relevant variables not included in the models are highly, 
but perhaps spuriously, correlated with the explanatory distance 
variable. This suspicion that distance may be an inappropriately 
used proxy variable is }Brticularly supported by the fact that the 
estimated }Brameters behave erratically with changes in the tem-
poral and aggregational settings. 
At least in the case of stochastic point models of the cell count-
ing variant it is well verified that the problems of }Brameter stabil-
ity are closely related to the classical geographic inference problem 
of form and process. (30) Thus, performed experiments with these 
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models provide clear evidence that several different behavioral pro-
cesses may generate the same spatial form. As a consequence, it 
is not safe to use the approach of the mentioned models, i.e. to take 
observed spatial patterns as given and then proceed to inferences 
about generating processes. Following Popper's dictum that society 
is best understood as the result of norms and decisions exerted by 
individual human beings, (31) it would therefore be dubious to advo-
cate that these same constructs be used as a basis for responsible 
social engineering. It is clearly impossible to say anything about 
the long term effects that implementation of such aggregate and form 
oriented constructs would have on the individuals involved. 
C. 3. The hierarchy of statements 
Geographers have yet to develop a set of constructs which have been 
based on antecedently understood theories ordered into causal se-
quences. Within the previously discussed context of correspondence 
rules and social engineering, it is nevertheless illuminating to stress 
that the spatial postulates of location theory frequently can be shown 
to be special cases of behavioral theorems. It follows that the ex-
planatory power and potential planning applicability of geographic 
theory does not depend on the employed and usually specified spatial 
axioms but rather on the unspecified axioms about individual and 
group behavior. {30) For the social engineer who looks to the spa-
tial analysts for theoretical guidance, this observation has impor-
tant and somewhat disconcerting consequences; this concern is ob-
viously related to my earlier remark that most existing studies have 
taken observed spatial patterns as given and then proceeded to state-
ments about generating processes and underlying human behavior. 
In conclusion, the nature of the causal sequences inherent in 
traditional spatial theories makes existing constructs less attrac-
tive from the social engineering viewpoint. There are, of course, 
signs that this situation may change, particularly as the earlier 
stress on the geometric outcome of the spatial model game has 
lessened in favor of analysis of the rules which govern the moves 
of the actors who populate the gaming table. Those researchers 
who now are pursuing this course seem to aim at a better under-
standing of those cause and effect relationships which are relevant 
to the decision makers themselves, i.e. to those who actions ev-
entually will determine the success of various social engineering 
endeavors. Essentially, these writers argue that geography should 
13 
()LSSON: GEOGRAPHY AND SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
be part of the study of human behavior and that theoretical statements 
which contain behavioral statetr.ents should be possible to falsify or 
confirm independently of their particular spatial context. This is 
clearly a reductionist argument, through which it is suggested that 
the releveance of any social science theory ultimately depends on 
its propositions about the micro units. It is only if those propos-
itions are made explicit that we will be able to formulate social 
science-social engineering theories which are internally consis-
tent in terms of moral preferences and long range side effects. 
D. Spatial Models as Social Engineering Tools: Concluding Remarks 
D. 1. Observational and theoretical statements 
By ascribing to the proposal that there is a need for planning and 
guided societal change, we seem to imply that there is something 
in the projection of today's empirical world that we may wish not 
to occur. If this is correct, then I submit that the use of spatial 
theories and models as social engineering tools may have contra-
dictory consequences. The reason for this warning is, of course, 
that practically all existing theories are positivistic and instrumen-
talist constructs in which the theoretical statements successively 
have been refined to agree better and better with current observation 
statements. To argue for extensive implementation of projections 
derived from these spatial constructs would therefore be conserva-
tive in the true sense of the word; planning based on descriptive sub-
ject matter models would only help to perpetuate the existing state 
of the world. In short, it strikes me as a contradiction in terms 
to argue for social engineering based on theories and models which 
originally were designed with the intent of describing past and cur-
rent observations as perfectly as possible. 
This conclusion suggests that the main problems in social engin-
eering concern some very fundamental methodological issues. It 
is true that continued empirical investigations may serve the indis-
pensable purposes of indicating first what actions are feasible, and 
second, what side effects these actions may generate. But the most 
serious thinking must nevertheless be geared towards the formula-
tion of alternative normative theories. The goal of these prescrip-
tive theories should perhaps be to arrive at normative solutions which 
are maximally just to those who would be affected by their implemen-
tation. (32) It follows that the present emphasis on theoretical and 
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representational models should be supplerr.ented by increased exper-
imentation with prescriptive or imaginary models whose moral pre-
mises have been made explicit. (13) 
As detailed earlier, this recommendation is based on my belief 
that it is sometimes more appropriate to attempt to rebuild reality 
so that it conforms with the moral premises of our prescriptive 
theories than to restructure scientific statements so that they con-
form with current empirical observations. In this sense, the yet-
to-be-forrr,ulated prescriptive theories could -- by focusing on the 
deontic issues of permitted and not permitted -- suggest alternative 
solutions to societal problems. Existing positivistic constructs with 
their intent of mirroring current observations could then -- by focus-
ing on the modal issues os possible and not possible -- indicate whe-
ther a particular normative plan is feasible, i.e. whether the pre-
scriptive theory agrees sufficiently well with the decision makers' 
observed behavior to actually work and produce intended results. 
Judging from the current state of the art, it would be premature 
to argue for extensive social engineering action based on existing 
spatial theories and models. To alter this situation requires analyses 
not only of what the current state of the world is but also of what the 
future states of the world ought to be. Although de on tic logic may 
well offer a suitable formal framework for such analyses, the first 
requirement is to redefine what is meant by a theory;(33) such re-
definitions will have to be found that descriptive and prescriptive 
theories can be allowed to bear more directly on one another. 
D. 2. Explanation and prediction 
A main theme of the essay has been that the best insurance against 
creating side effects is to have the social engineering action firmly 
anchored in explanatory as opposed to predictive analysis. Since 
the estimated parameters of an important family of spatial models 
tend to behave erratically over time. space, and aggregation levels, 
this was taken to indicate that we have not yet arrived at a reliable 
and non-trival set of general law statements in geography. It fol-
lows that extensive action based on the prediction of these models 
could be irresponsible. 
But the issues are not as simple as this categorical statement 
may suggest. The reason for the complexity is that despite the 
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non-stationarity of observed causal parameters, the correlation co-
efficients of the various distance rr.odels remain fairly high. One 
solution to this paradox is to recognize explicitly that the specifi-
cation errors can well be masked and statistically counteracted by 
autocorrelations for which distance serves as a good proxy variable. 
It is this characteristic that makes the distance models into rather 
accurate short term predictors despite the fact that their explana-
tory power is low. Action based on these constructs are therefore 
liable not only to preserve current spatial patterns but also perhaps 
to create long term undesirable side effects. The decision on whether 
to base social engineering on spatial models is consequently contingent 
on our particular tirre perspective; it may occasionally be defensible 
to use them as a basis for piecemeal social engineering with short 
term effects but never as a basis for more vigorous utopian social 
engineering. 
D. 3. The hierarchy of statements 
It should be clear by now that the descriptive and non-explanatory 
character of existing spatial models leaves me rather ambivalent 
about their use as social engineering tools. Even though I have 
argued that existing theories and models sometirr.es can serve the 
limited purposes of the piecemeal social engineer, I have repeat-
edly stressed that these constructs do not possess the epistemolog-
ical characteristics that would warrant their use in extensive piece-
meal social engineering let alone in more vigorous utopian social 
engineering. This judgment seems worthwhile regardless of whether 
we accept or reject Popper's view that any utopian action must be 
termed irresponsible. 
Considering at last the nature of aggregation levels and causal 
sequences in geographic theories, my earlier ambivalence remains. 
Thus, even if the issues connected with the moral foundations of 
these descriptive theories are sidestepped, I am left very concerned. 
The reason is, of course, that with the traditional focus on the 
spatial properties of the models, it is virtually impossible to say 
anything meaningful about the implied behavioral axioms. It follows 
that if we were to implement extensive social engineering endeavors 
based on existing theories,. then we may well be able to draw valuable 
conclusions about efficiency and large scale spatial consequences, 
but we would know little about the long range consequences for the 
individuals. This strikes me as regrettable, since it means that 
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until subject matter theories with different epistemological charac-
teristics have been formulated, the focus of our spatial planning 
rr.ust continue to be on supermarkets, roads, and airports, and not 
on the needs and desires of those individual human beings that the 
facilities allegedly are constructed to serve. (34) To argue other-
wise would be to extend a lirr.ited body of knowledge far beyond its 
boundaries. 
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